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Abstract
ment phase, frequently suffer from unexpected failures, which are
caused by insufﬁcient knowledge of the system failure processes.
In this paper, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian reliability model
that account for unexpected failures. For this, the sample space
of all failures is broken down into subspaces of expected failures
and unexpected failures. The overall reliability is, then, derived
based on the total probability theorem. A Bayesian network
model is developed to explicitly compute the probability of
unexpected failures. A single board computer reliability analysis
is considered and the results show that neglecting unexpected
failures overestimates the reliability.
ACRONYMS
BN Bayesian Network.
CPT Condition Probability Table.
DAG Directed Acyclic Graph.
SBC Single Board Computer.
NOTATIONS
PE Probability that failures are caused by expected pro-
cesses.
RE(t) Reliability model considering only expected failures.
RU (t) Reliability model considering only unexpected fail-
ures.
S The space that contains all possible failure events.
SE The subspace of expected failures.
SU The subspace of unexpected failures.
λU Rate of arrival of unexpected failures.
nU Number of observed unexpected failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliability models, such as reliability block diagram, fault
tree, physics-of-failure models, etc., have been widely used
in practice [1]. An implicit assumption is that, all possible
failure processes are considered in the reliability model. In
practice, however, new failure modes and mechanisms man-
ifest themselves, especially in systems at the early design
and development phases. For example, metal fatigue was ﬁrst
known to engineers only after the continuous explosions of
the airplane Comet in the 1950s and, thus, not considered in
the reliability analyses [2].
Unexpected accident scenarios have been discussed exten-
sively in the risk analysis community (e.g., see Aven et al.
[3, 4]). Kaplan et al. proposed a Bayesian framework to
consider unexpected scenarios,s in which a scenario called
“others” is added to to account for them [5]. The total risk
is calculated based on total probability theorem and can be
updated using Bayesian methods, when new observation data
become available [5]. Kazemi and Mosleh applied a similar
method in [5] to investigate the impact of surprising events
on credal risks [6]. Aven et al. proposed that the likelihood
of having unexpected or surprising events are inversely de-
pendent on the knowledge of the analysts, and developed an
assumption-deviation method for risk assessment considering
surprising events [3].
Existing methods mainly consider unexpected scenarios in
risk assessment. However, few researches have been conducted
to consider the impact of unexpected failures on reliability.
Furthermore, in the existing methods, the probability of unex-
pected events is assessed by expert judgement. In this paper,
we extend the model in [5] and develop a hierarchical Bayesian
model for reliability assessment accounting for unexpected
failures. A Bayesian Network (BN) model is developed to
evaluate the probability of unexpected failures in an explicit
way.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A hierarchical
Bayesian reliability model is developed in Sect. II to consider
the inﬂuence of unexpected failures. In Sect. III, we present
the developed BN for assessing the probability of unexpected
events. A reliability analysis of a Single Board Computer
(SBC) is conducted in Sect. IV. Finally, this paper is concluded
in Sect. V, with a discussion on future works.
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To account for the effect of unexpected failures, we assume:
1) The space that contains all possible failure events is
denoted by S and divided into the subspace of expected
failures, denoted by SE , and the subspace of unexpected
failures, denoted by SU :
S = SE
⋃
SU . (1)
2) SE and SU are mutually exclusive:
SE
⋂
SU = ∅. (2)
From Assumptions 1 and 2, the can be calculated using the
total probability theorem:
R(t) = Pr(T > t)
= RE(t) · PE +RU (t) · (1− PE),
(3)
where PE is the probability of expected failures, and RE(t)
and RU (t) represent the reliability with respect to expected
and unexpected failures, respectively.
To quantify (3) in practice, models for RE(t), RU (t) and
PE need to be developed. Conceptually, we assume that, the
reliability with respect to expected failures is modeled as:
RE(t) = g(t | θp) + , (4)
where g(·) is a probabilistic reliability model, whose pa-
rameters θp is subject to parametric uncertainty, represented
by a probabilistic distribution fθp , i.e., θp ∼ fθp ;  ∼
Normal(0, σ2m) describes structural uncertainty of the relia-
bility model [2, 7].
Bayesian models are developed for PE and RU (t), so that
prior expert knowledge and observation data (if available) can
be combined to obtain an integrated reliability estimations.
For PE , it is assumed that its prior distribution is a Beta
distribution, for calculation purposes:
PE ∼ Beta (Kθ,K(1− θ)) , (5)
where K is the prior sample size and a larger value of K
indicates that we have more trust on the prior distribution; θ is
the prior mean, which is an a priori estimation of PE based on
the prior knowledge. Beta distribution is chosen because it is
the conjugate distribution of the binomial likelihood function,
i.e., if we test n samples and observe nU unexpected failures,
the posterior distribution of PE can be updated by:
PE ∼ Beta (Kθ + nU ,K(1− θ) + (n− nU )) . (6)
For RU (t), it is assumed that occurrences of unexpected
failures follow a homogeneous Poisson process with a rate
λU and, therefore, RU (t) is calculated by:
RU (t) = e
−λU t. (7)
The parameter λU is assumed to follow a Gamma prior
distribution, for calculation purposes:
λU ∼ Gamma(α, β). (8)
The physical meanings of α and β are that our prior knowledge
on λU is equivalent to a “pseudo test”, in which we observe
α unexpected failures in a total test time β. Therefore, the
prior mean for λU is α/β. The reason for choosing a Gamma
prior (8) is that, it is the conjugate prior for the exponential
likelihood (7), i.e., if we observe nU unexpected failures with
times-to-failure t1, t2, · · · , tnU , then λU can be updated by
λU ∼ Gamma
(
α+ nU , β +
nU∑
i=1
ti
)
. (9)
III. Q BNS
To apply the model in Sect. II in practice, the prior distri-
butions for PE and λU need to be determined based on our
prior knowledge. Traditionally, this is done by directly asking
experts to estimate them. This procedure, while operational
in practice, remains opaque and subjective. In this paper, we
develop a BN model to explicit the prior knowledge on PE
and λU , so that their prior estimation can be done in a more
transparent way.
A BN is a probabilistic Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)
that describes causal dependencies among the nodes in the
graph. The dependencies are described by the directed links
between the nodes. Each node is associated with a Condition
Probability Table (CPT) that gives the condition probability
of observing its values given its parent nodes. Probabilistic
reasoning can, then, be conducted applying the Bayesian
theorem.
The structure of the BN for assessing the prior distribution
of PE is given in Figure 1. We consider three levels of PE
magnitude, as shown in Table I. For all levels, the prior
distribution of PE has prior sample size K = 10 but different
prior means, as shown in Table I.
TABLE I. THREE LEVELS OF PE MAGNITUDE
Level of PE K θ
Low (L) 10 0.1
Medium (M) 10 0.5
High (H) 10 0.9
θ and λU
As PE relates to insufﬁcient knowledge on the system
failure processes and consequent incompleteness of their mod-
elling and analysis, we consider two major factors: knowl-
edge, denoted by Y and system complexity, denoted by C.
RELIABILITY MODEL CONSIDERING
UNEXPECTED FAILURES
HIERARCHICAL
Figure 1. BN model for
UANTIFYING UNEXPECTED FAILURES USING
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Knowledge Y quantiﬁes how much we know about the system
and its failure processes. Such knowledge is gained through
engineering analyses. The more we know about the system
through these analyses, the less likely unexpected failures
are. On the other hand, system complexity inherently hides
unexpected failures: the more complex the system is, the more
likely it is that the analysis misses unexpected failures.
Three discrete levels (low, medium and high) are deﬁned for
Y and C. Probabilistic dependencies among Y , C and PE are
described by a CPT, denoted by p (PE | Y,C), which is con-
structed based on expert knowledge. The obtained knowledge
Y is further broken down into the knowledge Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4
derived from engineering analyses of the system. These engi-
neering analyses include, for example, Failure Modes, Effects
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Failure Report, Analysis,
and Corrective Action System (FRACAS), Reliability Growth
Test (RGT), Reliability Enhancement Test (RET) [2]. Their
contributions to knowledge achievement are tabulated in Table
II. It is assumed that each of the knowledge contributors Y1-
Y4 of the engineering analyses takes three discrete values
(problematic, satisfactory, ideal) and they are evaluated based
on predeﬁned scoring criteria in [2]. As p (PE | Y,C), a CPT
p (Y | Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4) is deﬁned to describe the dependencies
of Y on the knowledge contributors Yi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, often
determined by expert knowledge.
On the other hand, C is also decomposed into topological
(C1), interface (C2) and topological complexity (C3), which
can be evaluated following the guidelines provided in [8].
The deﬁnitions and evaluation guidelines for C1-C3 are given
below.
• Technology complexity measures how mature the tech-
nologies used in the system design are. In this paper, we
use
C1 =
n∑
i=1
5
(
Tmax − Ti
Tmax − Tmin
)
(10)
where C1 ∈ [0, 5] and a higher value of C1 indicates high-
er technology complexity; Ti is the technology readiness
level of the ith component and is evaluated using the 1-
9 scoring system of NASA [9]; Tmax and Tmin are the
maximum and minimum possible values for technology
complexities, respectively.
• Interface complexity results from the interfaces among
the components in the system. It is measured based on
the connectivity matrix A of the components [8]:
C2 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Aij (11)
where C2 ∈ [0, n] and a high value of C2 indicates
high interface complexity; Aij is the ijth element in the
connectivity matrix A; Aij = 1 when component i is
connected to j and Aij = 0 otherwise.
• Topological complexity depends on the structure of the
connectivity matrix A [8]:
C3 =
E(A)
n
(12)
where E(A) =
∑n
i=1 σi and σi is the ith singular value
of A. It can be veriﬁed that C3 ∈ [0,∞) and a large
value of C3 indicates high topological complexity.
The system complexity C, is, then, calculated by [8]:
C = C1 + C2C3. (13)
In practice, the evaluation starts from the source nodes
Yi and Ci. For Yis, three discrete levels, i.e., problematic,
satisfactory and ideal are deﬁned, and an evaluation is carried
out following the scoring criteria deﬁned in [9]. For Cis, the
evaluation is carried out ﬁrst, and then, the Cis are aggregated
to calculate the system complexity C using (13).
Based on the BN in Figure 1, the posterior distribution of
θ can be calculated as:
p(θ) = p(θ | y, C) ·
∑
y
p(y | y1, y2, y3, y4)·
p(y1) · p(y2) · p(y3) · p(y4) · p(C)
(14)
IV. C
In this section, we apply the developed model to the relia-
bility analysis of a SBC (Figure 2 [10]). Traditional reliability
evaluation of the SBC is often conducted using the parts-
count method in handbooks like Telcordia SR-332 [11], where
the system reliability of the SBC is assumed to follow an
exponential distribution and its failure rate λSBC is calculated
by
λSBC = πE
n∑
i=1
Niλi, (15)
where πE is an adjustment factor to reﬂect the difference in
operating environment, Ni is the number of the ith component
in the SBC, and λi is the equivalent failure rate for the ith
component, which is estimated from historical failure data of
similar products. Using (15) is equivalent to assuming that the
system is conﬁgured in a series structure and each component
has exponential lifetime distribution.
The failure rate of each type of components in the SBC is
given in Table III. Based on the data in Table III, the reliability
Figure 2. A SBC [10]
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KNOWLEDGE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ENGINEERING ANALYSES
Activities Knowledge contributions
FMECA FMECA helps designers to identify potential failure modes and understand their effects.
FRACAS By implementing FRACAS, knowledge on potential failure modes and mechanisms is gained based on previously ocurredfailures and corrective actions.
RGT In RGT, cycles of Test Analysis and Fix (TAAF) are repeated until the product reaches its reliability requirements. Bydosing so, designers’ knowledge on the failure modes and mechanisms is gainded.
RET RET stimulates potential failures, by highly accelerated stresses, which can generate failures that are hard to be identiﬁedby conventional tests.
TABLE III. FAILURE RATES FOR THE SBC COMPONENTS[10]
Component Failure rate (×10−9 h−1) Number of components
IC 384.8 51
Crystal oscillator 56 4
Inductance 6.56 6
Connector 32.76 9
Capacitor 40.5972 631
Resistance 648.9108 545
Others 16.16 20
of the SBC is
RSBC(t) = e
−1.186×10−6t. (16)
Now, we apply the modelling framework introduced in
Section III to account for unexpected failures. For simplicity,
but without loss of generality, we do not consider structural
uncertainty and parametric uncertainty in (4). Then, RE is
determined by (16). We assume that the prior distribution of
λUF is a Gamma(α, β) with
α = 10, β =
α
10λE
,
which indicates a prior sample size of 10 and a prior mean
of α/β = 10λE , where λE is the failure rate for expected
failures, since unexpected failures often occur early in the life
cycle and lead to “infant mortality”.
To assess PE , Yi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are evaluated based on the
criteria in [2], which leads to
Y1 = 0, Y2 = 1, Y3 = 1, Y4 = 3.
To consider complexity, the system architecture of the SBC is
given in Figure 3. Based on Figure 3, C1, C2 and C3 can be
calculated using (10),(11) and (12), respectively:
C1 = 1.25, C2 = 2.6, C3 = 0.8654.
Then, from (13), we have C = 3.5, which indicates that the
SBC has low complexity.
Applying the probabilistic reasoning procedure in (14),
we obtain the prior distribution for the PE , where PE ∼
Beta(K, θ) and the values for K and θ are given in Table
IV.
The reliability of the SBC, is, then, predicted using (3). The
results are given in Figure 4, where the uncertainty bounds
are determined by considering the prior distributions in (3).
It can be seen that considering unexpected failures leads to
TABLE IV. PRIOR PROBABILITIES OF PE LEVELS
Levels of PE K θ Probability
Low (L) 10 0.1 0.46
Medium (M) 10 0.5 0.52
High (H) 10 0.9 0.02
lower reliability estimations and larger uncertainty. Hence,
neglecting unexpected failures might overestimate reliability.
Sensitivity analyses are ﬁnally conducted to investigate the
inﬂuence of knowledge and system complexity on reliability.
From the comparison in Figure 5, it can be seen that when the
effectiveness of the engineering analyses increases, the knowl-
edge on the system enhances, and, therefore, the possibility
of having unexpected failures decrease. On the other hand,
TABLE II.
Figure 3. Architecture of the SBC
Figure 4. Reliability considering unexpected failures
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from Figure 6, it can be seen that when system complexity
increases, the possibility of having unexpected failures also
increases, and, therefore, the estimated reliability decreases.
Y1-Y4
C
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a hierarchical Bayesian
model to estimate reliability accounting for unexpected fail-
ures. BNs are used to explicitly quantify the model. A case
study on a SBC is used to demonstrate the application of
the model for reliability analysis. How to use failure data
(from both expected and unexpected failures) collected during
operation to update the estimated reliability is a future research
step.
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